Hello there and good afternoon. Welcome
once again to our Ukraine war Q&A. And
as you can see, delighted to be joined
in person yet again by Professor Michael
Clark. We were apart last week, Michael.
And I was devastated we got to talk down
the line, but I can see there your real
carbon based life form right in front of
me. So Michael is ready to answer all of
your questions. Thank you so much for
sending them in as always. Uh as I
always say, you can send them as you
watch along with us. We've got a a range
of topics to get through today and uh
some really decent questions. So, thank
you very much for all of those. We're
going to get started. Um Michael, we're
talking about a topic that I
particularly uh am interested in and
which has changed the the shape of of
modern warfare and that is drones. We've
had Dominic Wagghorn, our international
affairs editor, who was in a Ukrainian
drones factory last week, an exclusive
report talking about the Ukrainian
manufacturing of drones and a warning
that they may well actually be losing
the drones arms race. You can find Dom's
report on our website and I recommend
you do that. Um, so look, Michael, let's
get straight into it. This question from
Kieran here and it's and it is that is
Ukraine now losing the drone war to
Russia?
>> No. Um it's behind in qu qu qu qu qu qu
qu qu qu qu qu qu qu qu qu qu qu qu qu
qu qu qu qu qu qu qu qu quantity terms
because the Russians are now producing
drones at a very um high rate and so the
um this Alaba factory that the report
carried some footage from. I mean
Dominic was in the Ukrainian factories
which are pretty impressive. The Alaba
factory in Tartastan is really ramping
up production with lots of foreign labor
being brought in to work on it. North
Koreans are said to be prepared to
deploy a lot of labor to work in that
factory. So the Russians are really
ramping up the numbers. Ukraine are
probably still ahead technologically and
the Ukrainians are desperately trying to
ramp up their numbers as well and
they've got big ideas for uh I mean the
their flamingo drone which is their new
one uh and it's very good and is a lot
cheaper than the uh Russian alternatives
they're producing um I think it's 30 a
month at the moment and they're moving
up to 200 a month within a couple of
months and they'll move towards a
thousand a month probably next year. the
the problem that the Ukrainians have is
that they don't have enough money to
invest in the labor and the factories
that they need, but they are
technologically ahead. The other thing
we should say is everyone gets, you
know, excited about drones because they
are they're an important battlefield
innovation that's really reached new
heights. But, you know, drone warfare is
pretty unique to this particular war. It
won't be quite as unique to many other
wars because the nature of the terrain
in Ukraine because it's very flat and
it's very big, big areas to cover.
Drones make perfect sense in this war
and they've become a a substitute for
artillery. So these FPV drones,
first-person view drones, which can drop
one grenade on two or three soldiers in
a foxhole, is actually better than an
artillery barrage, which may or may not
kill them because it gets within 50
meters of them. Um, and so drones have
become a sort of artillery substitute,
which has been a big godsend to the
Ukrainians because they're so short of
artillery compared to the Russians. So,
you know, on the one hand, drone
technology is now a new feature of
warfare and will be a feature of warfare
from now on for the foreseeable future,
but it won't quite be this. It won't be
just Ukraine um in in on other
battlefields. What's happening in
Ukraine is pretty unique
>> in terms of drone warfare itself. So,
the Ukrainians, they're holding their
own. if they had more money to invest,
they're they're never going to match
Russian rates, but they could they could
match the technology and negate a lot of
Russia's quantitative um edge um with
the with the the quality of what they're
able to do and the the speed with which
they innovate. They're better than
anybody else in Europe at innovation.
They've really got the the software um
edge in terms of new ways of thinking
about drone production. with the amount
that they are producing. Of course, they
are a loss to Russia, but they do have
help from Europeans. There's a some
reporting is that the Finn have invested
some 700 million euros in manufacturing
drones. I think the the Dutch as well
and the French are helping with a number
of drones as well. I think the the Dutch
>> and all of these innovations will circle
back into Western forces. So in a way,
Ukraine, as is always the case, when
there's a a war going on, it's a
battlefield testing ground for all sorts
of things that either do work or don't
work. So in a way, the money that's
being put in by Western nations toward
to helping Ukraine is also an investment
um in our own development, which will
circle back into innovations that we can
develop and use.
>> Absolutely. And you mentioned the
Flamingo drone there. It's actually a
question later on from Lucas. Thank you
for this, when he asked about this
Flamingo missile, but since you brought
it up, let's talk about it now. this
Flamingo drone and tell us about its
capabilities and why have they called it
Flamingo?
>> Oh, yeah. It's it's the FP5. The the the
drone they're making most use of is the
FP1, which was their first person drone
one, and they are used in, you know,
hundreds of thousands across the
battlefield. Very effective, cheaper,
about a quarter the the cost of the
equivalent Russian drone. Um, and so the
FP1's been very good, and they've
innovated it to the the two, the three,
the four. The FP5 is the Flamingo drone.
It's actually, if you look at it, it
looks like an old V1 missile.
>> Huh.
>> Um, because it's got a pretty big engine
on the back and it's got a a long range.
It's got it's at least as long range as
Storm Shadow, right? The cruise it's a
cruise missile essentially.
>> 1,800 miles. It says the range.
>> That's right. It can get deep into
Russia. It's it's got the sort of range
of the atacoms, the the um American
groundbased rocket which they're not
allowing the Ukrainians to use against
Russian targets deep inside Russia. So
the Ukrainians have now developed their
own drone. The reason they call it
Flamingo is that the first um batch
there was something went wrong with the
metaly and they all came out pink.
>> Yeah. Well, that's that's one of the
reporting from the AP, but also I've
seen a Politico report that says I mean
the CEO of the company is a woman called
Edina Tekk and they say that the first
batch were all pink and that may have
been an issue.
>> It was a nickname. Yeah,
>> it was a nickname. But they also say
that it's it's sort of it's a it's a bit
of a joke on the fact that there is a
woman who's CEO of this company who is
now in this male-dominated space. And
you know,
>> it's the Ukrainian sense of humor. The
Russians would never do that.
>> No, they give it some kind of macho.
Although isn't their drone called the
geranium or something?
>> Well, yeah. No, the but because their
their um generation of missiles are all
named after flowers.
>> So, their version of the Shahid 136 is
actually the Shahid 238 and they call it
the the Jirean one and Juran 2 named
uranium. Yeah, but that's not a joke.
That's not that's just the way they name
things after flowers.
>> No, I'm not saying that flowers are
inherent female either. Flamingo could
when once the Ukrainians can produce
this in numbers
>> once they can they'll be far less
dependent on deep strike American
systems and so the fact that the
Americans won't allow them to use atoms
for deep strike wouldn't matter if they
had more flamingo drones
>> that's my question actually is that
going to free up space they're they're
home produced they carry a heavy warhead
they've got a long range
>> so none of that issue that Biden put in
place you can't use our weapons to
strike deep into this this is your
weapon you can use it as you what you
want with it. And they would like to use
Storm Shadow in the same way, but they
can't because we we the British, you
know, we cannot get the Americans to
allow permission for the targeting data
to be used for Storm Shadow in Deep
Strike.
>> And the Storm Shadow and the Scalp,
which is the French version of Storm
Shadow, same missile, the Ukraine are
running short of them. They probably
only got a few dozens left rather than
several hundreds. We we don't know, but
you know, they're down to um fewer
probably than a hundred. So they really
want to ramp up their production of
flamingo if they can and remember
they'll need to distribute the
production of it because the Russians
will be searching for these flamingo
factories.
>> Yeah. I mean the name of the company is
out there. You can find out why and
obviously they will.
>> So the Ukrainians will need to disperse
the production of it to make sure they
can go on producing them. But they'll I
mean if there was one big um priority
for Ukrainian industries at the moment,
>> well there's two big priorities. one is
air defense and the other is long range
missiles and the flaming flamingo for
the time being looks like the best
alternative.
>> I wonder if the thought would be to you
know do the reverse as to what's
happening with some of the drone
technology if that's being produced
outside of Ukraine. You could send the
flamingo technology outside of Ukraine
produced there and keep it nice and
>> cheapness of it because it's cheap and
it works. Um yeah, they can be produced
in high numbers.
>> Interesting stuff. All right, let's move
on to a question here from Ki. Um and
the question is if drones only cost
about $100 per unit, I mean probably a
bit more than that, why is the West
spending billions in Ukraine?
>> Well, u because drones are only one part
of the picture obviously, even though
they attract people's attention because
they've risen to the top of the agenda
over the last 12 months, but there's
many many things which the Ukrainians
need, not least air defense, which is
really important at the moment, plus um
the all the backup for their ground
forces and the armored vehicles and the
tanks and so on. Um so there are any
number of things which literally you
know drink finance um with an enormous
gulp all the time. That's the nature of
of industrial level warfare. So that
that's where where we are. Um and the I
mean the questioner is right in the
sense that one of the key elements of
the drone competition is the cost.
That's the point. It's it's the how
quickly can can you produce them and
what do they cost? I mean even 5 years
ago so much money was being spent on
every drone that nobody you know the the
innovation wasn't um bringing the cost
down but both sides have have been able
to reduce the cost quite a lot but but
the way the Ukrainians have produced
have reduced costs while maintaining the
quality of what they do that's very
impressive and that's better than the
Russians have managed
>> really interesting stuff all right um a
question from RJ about Europe ramping up
drone production we've kind of touched
on that Mark so if you'll allow us we'll
move on to our next question here. Uh
this is specifically on the fighting on
the ground. Now, Michael Dale asks this.
It was recently reported Russian forces
have broken through defenses in a number
of areas. However, the Ukrainians were
saying they were pushing back. What is
the latest in your understanding of the
battlefield? I mean, it's it's a
constantly moving map. It's not moving
much, but there are different pockets of
fighting and there a specific area of
course where they are fighting along
that line, that fortress belt as well.
>> Yeah. Well, two things um have happened
since then. We know that the the
fortress belt that we've talked about a
lot from Slavansky in the north to um
Costanti in the south that's still
intact as far as the Ukrainians are go
are concerned. The Russians simply can't
get into that fortress belt because it's
on the higher ground the series of
ridges. So it's very defensible.
>> But south and west of that at Doilia the
the Russians had this big push about 10
days ago now to the east of Doilia
trying to cut off to get behind the
fortress belt right
>> and it didn't succeed. They only sent
very light forces through to plant flags
and be photographed and so on. Um, so
they got the propaganda value out of it,
but actually the Ukrainians snuffed them
out pretty quickly. They deployed, we
think, the 33rd brigade and probably two
of the brigades of the new Azovv core,
which has been formed, which are some of
their best troops. And so they snuffed
that out um and they res restored the
the front as was there. Since then, the
Russians have said they've taken a
couple of villages over the border to
Nepro Petrrosk in a in a new oblast,
which is they had not been there before.
>> That's quite important, isn't it?
Because the the reporting of this u um
and the way that Oblast is described on
social on on the internet is that it's
uh the most important industrial region
of the country. There's no sense they're
going to take the entirety of it, but
you can see why the Russians would be
wanting to take.
>> Well, they've got two villages right in
the southeast corner. So, Zapariski and
uh Nova Herifka um are these two
villages um right on the border, but the
fact is they've crossed the border into
a an oblast that they don't claim or
they haven't claimed it yet, although
they I'm sure they will. Um and they've
they've moved over. Now, there's a
military logic in that because it will
stretch the Ukrainians. The Ukrainians
can't allow this to persist. So, they
need to deploy forces to stop that
getting any worse. I mean, two villages
neither here nor there. But they don't
want it to become a foothold which can
be based which can then be used for
reinforcement. And politically if the
Russians do stay there and do build it
up then it will become a strategic
advantage because they can they they can
they claim well in addition to the four
our blasts we are we are presently
demanding we're also now going to demand
a neo. Yeah.
>> Um and Denipra Petro Petrrosk is
important. It would take them right up
to the um eastern bank of the Neper
River which is a very important part of
Ukraine. So, I mean, this incursion is
minor in territorial terms, might turn
out to be important unless the
Ukrainians can snuff it out. And again,
if I was the if I was Cerski, the chief
of staff of the Ukrainian armed forces,
I'd put some uh, you know, I would
sacrifice elsewhere to make sure this
didn't happen.
>> Interesting to try and make sure they
can't go further. Now, just sort of as a
as a footnote on this, we're in August,
September now. Fighting season is going
to come to a closeber, right? Okay. So
there is that this is a period now where
we are like
>> and that's all they'll have left until
it freezes up again and they have to
>> Yeah. Again I mean the weather won't
change. I mean the weather changes but I
mean the weather is very predictable as
we always say in Ukraine. So by the end
of October it'll get wet. I mean
fighting continues in that sort of
weather but things slow down and
offensive certainly slow down as again
as we've said many times before. I mean
fighting in the winter is miserable for
everybody but it favors the defender
over the attacker generally speaking.
And just to finally, I wanted to check
this before I said it uh on TV, but
Denro Petro's oblast is the oblast where
Kiri is. And that's of course the home
city of President Vladimir Valencia. So
very important for the Ukrainians,
>> symbolically important as well as
industrially important. Yeah,
>> absolutely. All right, let's move on. Um
Martin Celite asks, "What are the
chances the entirety of the Donbas falls
soon?" So that's Detsk and Luhansk. They
hold all of Luhansk. there's a bit of
daets that they don't hold yet
>> about 30%. Which is where these fortress
cities are. So the if you look at a map
of Russian gains you they're more or
less the whole of Luhansk the ground and
all the villages and settlements in
between. Uh and the you the strategic
importance of that is if the Russians
were given this area which is what they
demand if the Ukrainians just you know
left it because it was part of the deal
then the Ukrainians would find it hard
to going further westwards they'd find
it hard to find an area they could dig
in for the next line of defense that
would be anything like as effective and
the high ground if if this high ground
was in Russian hands it would be a
perfect jumping off place for the next
phase of their offensive in a year's
time or 18 months or two years time when
they when they will try to move up to
the river uh the Neper River and take
the whole of of the eastern part of
Ukraine. That's their next objective
before the the rest of Ukraine which is
you the ultimate objective.
>> It remains stated objective. What what
do we know about their sort of plans for
for this phase of the war? Do they want
to take the entirety of the of the
Donbass at this stage?
>> They do. I mean again the Russians have
never um said that that's all that they
want. I mean they've always said that
they want the whole thing and Putin's
made that very clear. But there's a sort
of general sense that if he could grab
the whole of the Donbass and then pause
in order to let Trump take the credit
for peace making and so on and therefore
gain some benefit with his relationships
with America for the next three four
years. Um that would make a certain sort
of sense. It would be a sensible pause
from his point of view. He could present
it to the Russian people as a victory.
He'd say we've protected the Russian
speakers in the Donbass even though
that's you know irrelevant. Russian
speakers the whole in the whole of
western Ukraine. Um but he'd say you
we've protected the Donbass, we've
looked after our people. Um and even
though the cost has been high, the
special military operation has been
worth it.
>> Talk to us a little bit about the
historical sort of symbolism of that. Is
that is this the Novaria area? This the
area that he talked about.
>> Yeah. Katherine the Great's empire. I
mean Katherine the Great, you know,
Peter the Great pushed the empire to the
north of Russia into the into the
Scandinavian countries. Cathedral great
in the 18th century pushed the Russian
Empire along the the Black Sea coast. So
Novarosia no new Russia was you know
literally spread from you know Rostov
from what is now western Russia right
along that coast to into Muldova and so
onto the borders of Romania and that was
Nova Russia and I mean that that phrase
is used in the Russian press quite a
lot. Putin uses it in speeches
occasionally. Um, I mean it's it's a bit
like, you know, when the Israelis talk
about Judea and Samaria,
>> that's the West Bank to the rest of the
world.
>> It rings in people's ears who who know
>> Judea and Samaria is the is the
symbolic, you know, biblical phrase for
what they want to take. And so, Novaria
is the historical label for what the
Russians would like to be part of
Russia. Yeah.
>> All right, let's uh move on then. A
question here from Carl G. We're really
ticking through these today, Michael. I
think your answers are short.
Have you have you shortened them
deliberately?
>> I've stopped listening to yourself.
Yeah,
>> you stop paying attention how long you
talk. All right. Well, let's keep going.
Carl G, question here about F-16s. How
is Ukraine using the F-16 uh that they
have been provided with? They they are
they're operational.
>> They are. Um I mean the the Ukrainians
have been very cy about it. We don't
know how many they've got, but we think
it's probably 50, maybe 60. They need
you a couple hundred to make a bigger
difference. But they are they're out
there certainly working on um air
defense, shooting down cruise missiles
where they can. Okay. They're also um
taking on Russian helicopters uh which
are you know flying near the border and
any Russian aircraft that come over the
border. What's interesting is that the
Russians are not using their air power
inside Ukraine nearly as much as they
were um because they can get to the
front lines without leaving their own
airspace. Generally speaking, the glide
bombs, you know, generally can be
aircraft can be only just over the
border into Ukrainian airspace when they
when they release their bombs and the
bombs then glide, you know, up to 30
miles onto the front line. Um, so the
the F-16s have had an effect in pushing
the um Russian Air Force back and in
creating more of a defensive um area.
What I'm not aware that the F-16s are
being able to to make a big difference
to the front line mean to to do combat
air support which is is aircraft
operating against ground targets.
>> I mean air forces hate doing that. Well
the F-16 will do it but um you you lose
aircraft like that
>> because of surface. It's so dangerous. I
mean the air force hates doing it. Air
forces hate it.
>> They want to stand off as far as
possible fly
>> and they want to do strategic bombing.
They they want to bomb the opposition in
a strategic way behind the lines or you
know, having to attack the front lines
is a really dangerous problem.
>> Probably seen in the movies, but it's
just not something that
that's the movies. The best the best
frontline um um CS uh combat air support
aircraft ever is the old the Warthog,
the the Thunderbolt A10, right?
>> Uliest aircraft in the world and the
pilots who flew them loved them because
the troops on the ground loved them
because when an A-10 was around it was a
tank buster. It could it could shoot up
um you know, opposition columns and so
on. Everybody loved the A-10, but I mean
it's an old aircraft now and uh it did
some pretty dangerous things. I mean to
be honest, I've often wondered why, you
know, why why didn't America transfer
all the A10s it had to Ukraine in the
early days? That might have made a
difference.
>> H that is interesting. They could have
done that, couldn't they? They might
have.
>> I recognize this plane from films I
watched about the
>> I've seen it for many years. Ugliest
aircraft in the world, but my goodness,
it was effective level. Yeah.
>> So the So the F-16 is not doing that.
>> Yeah, the F-16 can do lots of things. It
can do ground support. Um, but it's not,
you know, it's not really made for it.
And I I'm guessing that the Ukrainians
don't want to risk it in that role. If
they lose too many, then they lose the
air superiority ability of it, which is
crucial to holding back the Russian air
force.
>> It's worth thinking as well, there was a
period when that's all we were talking
about, the Ukrainians getting F16s. He
came here, President came to to
parliament to Westmin,
right? So like
>> that idea that they needed them so
desperately has their use been
commensurate to the demand that we had
for them to to be
>> No, it hasn't really. And I think you
know a lot of of air specialists were
saying at the time, look, don't get too
excited about the F-16. There are lots
of reasons why it's a good aircraft to
use. There are lots of them around. The
Ukraans can get lots of F-16s that are
being stood down from their NATO allies
who are going in for the F-35 and so on.
So good, you know, you can have you can
you can get them, you can get servicing
for them. It's a very common aircraft
and it will do lots of different things,
but it won't transform um the air
environment unless the Ukrainians had
two or 30 hundred of them and they'll
only ever get, you know, 40, 50, 60, 100
or whatever. So, it'll it's more an
investment in Ukraine's future air force
than in the air power they needed back
in 2023, 24 when it when it really
mattered.
>> Interesting. All right, let's move on to
a question here about Starink. I know
you you like to think about this,
Michael, because it's just so useful and
it's extraordinary to think that the
private firm, the private the toy of
this billionaire is so vital to the war
effort of Ukraine. A question here from
George Wake. Will Elon Musk remove
Starlink access for Ukraine soon, and
would that be game over?
>> Well, um I mean, no and no, I think is
the is the short answer. So, will it be
removed? It could be. Um but at the
moment, it seems not. I mean the the the
the word coming out of Washington is
that and this may turn out not to be
true because you know everything in
Washington goes bangs between the State
Department, the Pentagon and the White
House and nobody's sure you know who's
making decisions. Everyone refers it to
somebody else. Um but the word coming
out this week is that the United States,
whatever happens, will continue or is is
minded to continue intelligence
cooperation um with the um Ukrainian
forces. Um and they do that it costs
them nothing because the the US
intelligence is looking at all this
stuff all the time for its own purposes.
So they don't have to do anything that
they wouldn't wouldn't do anyway. The
question is will they then they give it
as a matter of being helpful to the
Ukrainians? And the answer is yes, they
would. And it is said they'll maintain
the stalling system. Now, they could
change because it could be turned off.
Um, there are upwards of 40,000
terminals
>> Mhm.
>> operating in Ukraine. It's being paid
for by Poland. The Polish government is
putting in about $50 million a year to
buy the link. So, it's not costing I
mean, it's all good business for Elon
Musk.
>> I was going to say it's all going to
Elon Musk and
>> it's not costing the Americans anything.
The Europeans, mainly the polls are
paying for it. So, you know, there's
there's every reason you with it being
like that? I mean, like, if you know,
the Ukrainians using it, are other
people unable to use it or is that not
how satellit more and more terminals go
up? I mean, we're looking at there's in
low Earth orbit. I was funny enough, I
was I was talking about this yesterday
to a different group. In low Earth
orbit, there are presently 11,000
operating satellites.
>> Well, I'm by 2030 another 70,000 will
join them. Most of them will be
Starlink. Wow. So we'll end we'll go
from because the figure always used to
be 8,000 for many years didn't change
very much and it's gone from it'll go
from 8,000 to 81 82,000 in in a decade
in low earth orbit and many of those a
lot of those will be Starlink and so
there's because it's cheap that's what
that's the genius of Elon Musk and
SpaceX is not putting satellites into
low earth orbit it's the cheapness of
them again which has changed the the
balance of advantages militarily So the
Ukrainians have got the benefit of
Starling. The Americans say they'll
maintain it, but they do have the
capacity to turn it off. If they turned
it off, is that game over for Ukraine?
No, but it would be much more difficult
for them for them. Could they continue
with European support? Yes, they could,
but it wouldn't be as good as Starat
support. Europeat there. So there is an
>> There is. Yeah, but it's not as as
ubiquitous, right?
>> It's more expensive. It'll take time. I
mean, the Europeans are desperately
trying to replicate Starlink because
they don't trust the they don't trust
Elon Musk. They don't trust American
policy.
>> And obviously, it's all proprietary
software, so you can't like replace one
terminal with a different satellite.
Like they they they have to talk to one
another. So, it has the same system.
>> They do. Yeah. Yeah. So, the Europeans
can partially
compensate for losing Starlink and the
Ukrainians could carry on, but it would
be more difficult.
>> Sat I think is the European version.
>> Yes. Um, and there are questions as to
whether
>> and it's it's only been going really for
about it's been accelerated only in the
last 5 years, right? Before that it was
going in at a rather sort of stately
pace. But now there's this sense that we
mustn't we in Europe we mustn't be too
dependent on anything from the United
States because we're not just talking
about President Trump here. I mean
Trump's four years. We're talking about
maybe you know the the the Trumpist
president after that. I mean this may be
as we've said before this this Trump
period may last 12 years or even longer
in the United States and the US that
emerges from this will be a different
United States anyway
>> but like we have said before as well
Michael especially on the weapons
production within Europe and maybe not
the worst thing in the world that this
has happened now to make Europe
>> no standard that's right I mean like
like anything else I mean there are good
sides to this I mean you know President
Trump will always be given the credit
for shocking the Europeans into taking
defense more seriously you know the
holiday from history is over the holiday
from history that began in 1991 when the
cold war came to an end. That holiday is
over. The peace dividend is over and the
Europeans have understood that for the
last 10 years but weren't taking it
seriously and Trump has shocked them
into taking it seriously and history
will always say that whatever else we
say about Trump and history I think be
very unkind to him or be very critical
of him but it will recognize that as as
a a real benefit.
>> I'll say that Putin had his role in this
as well because Trump was saying this
back when, wasn't he? at the first NATO
conference spend more. Everyone was
like, "Okay, yes, we'll spend more."
They didn't spend anymore.
>> Yeah. They committed to it, but didn't
really Putin invading Ukraine to hold on
a minute. We have to get this get this
done and get this right. And as I say,
it's not the worst thing in the world.
>> And it will be done, but probably not
quickly enough. So 2030, 2035 are now
the realistic um time is a realistic
time frame for the Europeans being
adequately defended.
>> It's not that far off. It's not that far
off.
>> All right. Um, let's move into the final
section. Efforts to end the war here.
Um, the Putin Zalinsky meeting. Mark Kay
asks, "Is that now not happening?" I
mean, was ever going to happen? Um, I
personally think not, but we are
pretending that it might because um all
of the politics and the politics are
ramping up this week behind the scenes.
All the politics are really about who
does Trump blame when it all breaks
down.
>> Mhm. um if he blames Zilinsky and the
Europeans then other things may follow
in that they may withdraw support on
intelligence cooperation so on of the
sort we've been talking about. If he
doesn't blame Zilinski if he blames
Putin then that's good. If he blames
both equally that's we could live with
that.
>> So all of the all of these um maneuvers
are really about the blame game. What
Putin is saying is he will not meet
Zalinski one to one. he just won't do it
and because he says Zilinski is not
legitimate and you know he leads a
regime a fascist regime and I'm not
going to meet him and what he says the
most we will do he says we could have a
peace deal with at foreign minister
level which both presidents support and
zilinsky said no no it's got to be a
one-to-one meeting you want to talk to
me talk to me and I will come and talk
to you
>> and Donald Trump seems to see the logic
of that that there needs to be a Putin
Zalinski meeting at which he will join
them and bring them both together but
Putin has said he absolutely it won't.
The other thing that's that's going on
is that both sides are talking specifics
about territorial swaps within Ukraine,
not because they think it'll happen, but
because they think they need to be seen
to talk about it. And the Ukrainians are
actually playing quite a good hand. Very
much advised by Jonathan Powell, who's
our British national security advisor.
He's very close to Andrew Yarmak, who is
the presidential um aid to Zilinski.
Yamak is really influential and Powell
and Yarmak are working hand in in hand
all the time on a daily basis. The
Ukrainians are actually playing it quite
well behind the scenes in showing the
Americans that they're being as
constructive as they possibly can. Okay,
so they are talking about territory.
They are talking about what they might
be prepared to live without for now.
They are talking about, you know, more
exchange of prisoners. They're talking
about the modalities of a meeting and so
on. And so they are kind of maneuvering
Putin into the position where he has to
keep digging his toes and saying, "I
won't do this, I won't do that. to make
him look like he's obstructed to Donald
Trump eventually.
>> So it is moving in Ukraine's direction.
But all this I stress is shadow boxing
because nobody believes this is going to
work really. But they all believe that
they have to set out their stall so that
when Trump realizes that it won't work.
Who does he blame? And we're in this
position now where we had the big push
at the Alaska summit
>> and there wasn't a meeting as a result
of that, it'll go for another two or
three weeks and then it'll all blow up
again into a moment where Trump says we
have to have a meeting. we have to
conclude this deal. That will probably
be quite soon. Two weeks, three weeks
>> and then it'll be critical. So, we're in
that sort of that that dip in between
two big proposed summits. The second
summit in two or three weeks probably
won't happen, but there'll be a big push
to talk about it and the Ukrainians are
positioning themselves and the Europeans
for that. And you know, the the Germans
are really going all in on this.
Frederick Mertz is really trying to lead
the Europeans. I mean whether he's got
enough domestic support we don't know
but he's so far he's really assertive
about this
>> and about helping Ukraine talking about
the European security force that may
back it nobody believes it will happen
but but we're putting lots of planning
into it to show that we mean it and you
know maybe maybe events will call our
bluff maybe it will
>> well he was the only one around the
table who talked about there being a
ceasefire before any meeting at at
summit at uh at the white house um a
couple of days after Alaska and I was
Donald Trump was talking on TV yesterday
after his cabinet meeting. Uh, and he
was talking about this meeting between
Zilinsky and Putin, will it happen? It
may not happen. Going around in circles
the way he does with with his um
>> with his sentences. And it got me to
thinking about in his first term. Do you
remember when he had infrastructure week
every single week because he could never
actually get the thing done? This feels
to me like he's starting to get that
sense that it's he announces it, but yet
we're going to keep going through the
motions of it. So, we actually
>> probably never get there until he's not
around. But in a way see that that is
what leaders do that leaders you know go
ahead of the of events and say this is
what's going to happen and I commit to
it and so on and that's one technique of
leadership but the point is that leaders
have got to have a realistic view as to
what can happen and they've got to have
good advice as to if I if I go out on a
limb on this am I going to stay on a
limb or is everyone else going to come
with me and the point about Trump is
he's advised by people who are loyalists
not realists and his loyalists tell him
what he wants to hear and and I don't
think he listens I mean he listens to
and then he does his own thing anyway.
And so he constantly goes out on a limb
on things which are completely
unrealistic. And that's what he seems to
be doing in this case. He's doing it
with Gaza in the same way. You It's a
leadership technique, but the leaders
have got to have the instinct to know
which limbs to go out on, where to where
to offer the lead and where just to hold
back.
>> I don't think he has any any instinct
like that.
>> Interesting. All right. Um, couple of
questions that we've had come in from uh
people in the chat. This one from Dan
Cy. Thank you for this, Dan. Uh Donald
Trump has put in those 50% tariffs on
India from today right uh what impact
will it have on the war at all Dan asks
will it just be shrugged off by India
what if India stops buying all I mean I
did think the response from Narendra
Modi the Indian prime minister about
this um was quite interesting he said
it's economic coercion I thought yes
exactly what it is well 25% is meant to
be the reciprocal tariff reciprocal and
inverted compos isn't at all but I mean
that was the tariff that was put on as
as part of tariffs on other countries in
the world and then another 25% is just
slapped on as punitive because India is
buying Russian oil and it's buying an
enormous amount of Russian oil. Um so
this is a secondary tariff. So he's done
a little bit of what he threatened to
do. He threatened to put secondary
tariffs on everybody who dealt with
Russia and of course the everybody would
have included China and he won't do that
because they're in the middle of talks
to regularize relations and it it would
have affected Turkey and a lot of other
countries. So he hasn't done that. So
he's picked on India. He picked on India
for different reasons. He doesn't get I
mean although he him and Modi think they
get on he doesn't he doesn't really get
>> he fell out over the settling of that
little conflict between and he was here
and Pakistan
>> between over Kashmir and he was annoyed
with Modi and America has suddenly moved
closer to Pakistan interestingly and the
Pakistanis have been clever enough to
say we we really wanted to get the nobel
peace prize we want to push for it
with the Nobel committee so they've
ingratiated themselves to him and he's
introduced this punitive tariff what
will it mean well there's um about $86
billion worth of trade between India and
the United States. Indian economists
seem to reckon it probably fall to 50
billion dollars. It'll probably take 1%
of India's GDP growth which is you know
considerable in you know that that hurts
but at the moment Modi is not in a mood
to cave in. And the other thing I think
that bothered Trump is that when Trump
announced this everybody else's reaction
is to rush to Washington to talk to him.
Modi didn't. No.
>> And Modi hasn't had a conversation with
him since he announced this other 25%.
And Modi just sat still and so it's come
into force and he has and Modi hasn't
tried to talk to him and I think that
upsets him.
>> Interesting. He wants him there
cowtowing and and making the the pulley.
No. Um the reason he's put it in on
India and you know he won't put it in on
China yet is because is it is it because
>> he realizes that the global economy
might not be hurt quite as badly as
>> Yeah. Yeah. Absolutely. I mean if I mean
secondary sanctions of the sort he was
talking about 100% sanctions on oil
trade
you know particularly with China and and
India would actually force the price of
oil up and increase global inflation. Um
so he was very reluctant to do that. We
all knew he wouldn't. Um and I'd be
amazed if he put sanctions of this sort
um on China. But there they are. I mean
25% sanctions on India. It's I mean it's
it's a a quarter of what he said he
would do. He said he put 100% sanctions
on everybody as as punitive. So it's a
quarter of what he claimed on one
country.
>> Um is it an advantage to Ukraine? Yes.
Uh to a degree. It it does show that the
United States is still biddable in the
in the the the struggle to get the US to
put pressure on Putin. Will it really
upset the Russians? Not much yet, but
they'll be watching it carefully.
>> Couple more questions, Michael. And and
still on sort of the ends of this war if
we ever get to towards the end of this
war. This is a question that's come in
from uh viewers watching along. Jamie
Harris, thank you for this one. Um, and
this question asks, "Will British
maritime regiments be used to assist
Ukraine?" I guess that is
>> maritime regiments. What the Marines?
>> I mean, I'm reading it specifically. So,
let you interpret it. Jamie, do you want
to write in again and tell us exactly
what you mean?
>> If I don't know if James means the
Marines, um, possible
>> or perhaps maritime I mean units like
the Navy, would they be used as well?
>> Maritime units. Yeah. Um I mean there's
there's there's ways in which um all
three branches of the British armed
forces might contribute to some sort of
reassurance force. Um the the the most
obvious way is the air force because an
an air policing zone is more feasible
than most the other things. Um ground
forces might be deployed as some sort of
reassurance force might. I don't think
it'll happen but that's in it's on the
it's on the table to western Ukraine. Um
and certainly Marines might well be part
of that because they're specialized
troops. Um operating in the Black Sea um
to keep the Black Sea open is a very
good um strategic aim. But to do that,
you've got to have permission to go
through the straits.
>> Have Turkey saying Turkey but they might
allow it. If if there were a peace deal,
Turkey might say, "Okay, the Mantra
Convention is now allows us now to allow
warships through." So the Russians would
send warships from their northern fleet
to bolster their their Black Sea fleet,
which is a third down and doesn't have a
flagship. So the Russians would build up
their Black Sea fleet, but NATO forces
might go through the Black Sea to help
enforce a um a zone of a peaceful zone.
They could do that. Um it's it's
possible. I think that's might be a bit
of a stretch. I think it's more likely
that if we helped enforce a a ceasefire
across the Black Sea, it would be by air
by aircraft probably and surveillance.
>> Okay, let's do a final question. It's
World War II again, Michael. I know you
hate talking about this, but question
here from Ryan. Why do Zakistan and
President Macaron have their hearts, he
says, on placing troops in Ukraine even
if we had US air support? Doesn't it
risk World War II?
>> Yeah. No, it doesn't risk World War II,
but it does risk um a a military
confrontation with the Russians.
>> That's one of the reasons why
>> Why wouldn't that be World War II? Just
quickly,
>> no, it wouldn't. That's the point. The
Russians always always pretend that if
anybody in Europe um gets into a tussle
with them, it'll be World War II. And
they they because they threaten
everybody this all the time. And as long
as they keep Europeans frightened of it,
then they'll keep moving forward. You
know, if you take us on, it'll be World
War II.
>> Because in the mind, World War II means
nuclear bombs straight away.
>> Exactly. Yeah. Yeah. And it's I mean we
are a long long way from that. And you
know they will say that you President
Putin genuinely he is a man of peace. He
is a man of peace. He wants a piece of
this, a piece of that, a piece of
something else.
>> So he is a man of several pieces. And
the Russians will keep doing this as
long as we're frightened of of taking
them on militarily. And my sense I mean
people talk, you know, tell me I'm such
a wararmonger, but you know, my sense is
that we're heading for at the moment
we're heading for a military
confrontation with Russia at some point
in the next 5 to 10 years. And we can't
choose whether this is the case. I mean,
we can only choose where and when that
confrontation may take place. That's
what I think. We I we may be able to get
off this road, but it's a road that they
are on and which unless we're prepared
to keep backing away and letting them
keep coming as it were. Um then sooner
or later we have to be prepared to stand
up to this threat. Whether Macron and
Star, they're not determined to, you
know, put boots on the ground. What
they're saying is they're determined to
try to stay close to the American idea
of getting a ceasefire. And the best way
to stay close was to try to back up
American policy. Even though privately
we think it's not going to work, we have
to back it up. If they didn't, if they
just sat and said, "Well, we'll see what
the Americans do." The Americans,
remember this this Trump administration,
they hold the Europeans in contempt.
They despise us actually for they don't
just oppose. They despise us. And they
would say, "Look, the Europeans are
useless. They sit there and do nothing.
They leave it all to us again." So it is
logical that the Europeans led by
Britain and France should say, "Look,
President Trump, if you've got a peace
deal, we will try and back it up. We'll
try to make it work, whatever you can
do."
>> And that's what we're doing. And in a
sense, they're damned if they do.
They're damned if they don't. If they do
nothing, it looks as if we are hopeless.
If we if we back it up in a way that
looks not especially realistic. It looks
as if we're being foolish.
>> But it's a choice of lesser evils. Let's
try to back it up. Let's see where it
goes. Um, believe me, I mean, neither
British nor French um, politicians or
military chiefs are anxious to put boots
on the ground. Not least because
previous head of defense studies,
um, Lord Lord Phil Marshall, Lord
Richards, as you know, is, I mean, he
keeps making the point if we put British
troops into Ukraine, we lose them for a
generation or more. 5,000 a brigade of
troops or two brigades, 10,000, that's
it. Say goodbye to them for the next 30
years, 40 years because they'll be there
for a very long time. can't use them for
anything else. We'll always have to have
five or 10 thousand there for the next
couple of generations and that will
actually knock the guts out of the a
British army of 70,000 as it presently
exists.
>> It's a very
>> don't want to do it.
>> We might end up doing it as the worst as
the you know the best option against
against some bad options but believe me
we don't want to.
>> I have put this question to you I think
last week this final point cuz I got to
get on telly as always. Uh I put this
question go and do your job my day job
and I put it to Andis Rasmmanson as
well. Um, is it now time to call Putin's
block on some of this and put the troops
in? Because Ander Rasmson, as I spoke to
him a couple of weeks ago, said it,
Russian feelings about NATO troops in
Ukraine can mean not one thing to anyone
in the NATO alliance because it's up to
us what we do with our troops and where
we deploy them. Absolutely right.
>> It's time to to really just call his
bluff and say, "Well, these are troops
here and this is this is the settlement
that we've got."
>> Yeah. Simple answer. Yes. I mean I mean
Putin I mean you know bluffs and
blusters all the time and he's extremely
aggressive and he constantly threatens
war. constantly implies nuclear weapons
and he knows that it frightens people.
Um if we if we just give into that then
we'll just go on doing it for the next
10 years or so. So yes, at some point
we've got to be prepared to say this is
what we do and NATO has a perfect right
to deploy troops if they're asked by
Ukraine into a friendly state. Of course
they can. Um and if I mean the idea that
Russia has a veto over what an
independent state is allowed to do is
absurd and we shouldn't go along that
logic earlier. Um, uh, Sergey Lavrov
said it earlier. All right, Michael,
that's it for us for this week. I think
you might be on telly with me the next,
uh, throughout the afternoon for some
more of this. Thank you all again for
watching as always for submitting your
questions. Hope you got through as many
of them as you would have liked. And
we're going to do this again next week.
I think our schedules will align. So,
let's uh, see you all again soon.
Thanks, Michael. Speak later.